

BORDER MANAGEMENT AND INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA, A STUDY OF ISWAP IN THE NORTH

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Abstract

This work examined “Border Management and Insecurity in Northeast Nigeria, 2015-2023. It systematically examined how poor border management has contributed to the resilience of insurgency in the Northeast Nigeria between 2015 and 2023. The specific objectives of the study were to: ; examine how poor border management has contributed to the resilience of ISWAP insurgency in Northeast Nigeria between 2015 and 2023; interrogate ways in which poor border management has contributed to access to arms and light weapons by ISWAP insurgents in Northeast Nigeria between 2015 and 2023; ascertain how poor border management has contributed to drug trafficking by ISWAP insurgents in Northeast Nigeria between 2015 and 2023. The study adopted the explanatory research design, and specifically adopted the documentary method of data collection which involved a systematic extraction of data from secondary sources - published or unpublished. Accordingly, the researcher utilized the textual method of data analysis for the study. The study is anchored on the theory of transnationalism popularized in the early 20th century by Randolph Bourne. The study found that poor border management has contributed to the resilience of insurgency in Northeast Nigeria; poor border management has accounted for the access to small arms and light weapons by ISWAP in the Northeast Nigeria; and that poor border management has contributed to drug trafficking by ISWAP leading to the growing terror activities in the Northeast Nigeria. To this end, the study recommended that effective border management system should be put in place to effectively checkmate the incidence of irregular migrations; and drug smuggling should be seriously fought by the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and other Law Enforcement agents to ensure that supplies are cut off from the various criminal groups in the Northeast and Nigeria in general.

Keywords: Borders, Insurgency, ISWAP, Management, Nigeria

Introduction

The idea of border management has its origin in antiquity. However, the earliest systematic attempts of modern nation states to implement border management to restrict entry of particular groups were policies adopted by Canada, Australia, and America to curtail immigration of Asians in white settler states in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The first anti-East Asian policy implemented in this era was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 in America, which was followed suit by the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 in Canada, which imposed what came to be called the Chinese head tax. These policies was a sign of injustice and unfair treatment to the Chinese workers because the jobs they engaged in were mostly menial jobs (Bodenner, 2023).According to 9/11 Commission Report (2004), the USA took cognizance for the need for adequate management of security at its borders after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States of America (USA).For instance, the erstwhile Department of Border Management (DBM) under the ministry of Home Affairs was replaced with the Department of Homeland Security(DHS).Additionally, its extensive border with Mexico was fenced and equipped with modern surveillance equipment to prevent free and illegal

movement across the border. These efforts were aimed at ensuring national security through effective border management.

In Africa, Gwakwa, Ndebele and Kachere (2016) observed that the negligence, poor, or lack of effective management of African borders has largely contributed to a prevalence of threats such as cross-border crimes. It is important to point out that the Declaration on the African Union Border Programme (AUBP) and the Modalities for the Pursuit and Acceleration of Its Implementation made in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2010, paved the way for the development of Strategy for Enhancing Border Management in Africa. Of interest to point at this juncture is that, in the continent, most governments appear not to effectively master where state borders are, their nature/characteristics, and what is moving across them. Because of this fact, these borders are not monitored, patrolled or controlled. Because of that most if not all, African borders (Beitbridge, Ramakwebane, Chirundu Border posts are no exceptions to this) are transnational crime zones (Gwakwa et al, 2016).

Conspicuously, Nigeria has one of the most porous borders in the world with 4,047 km (Hoffmann & Melly 2015). The borderland between Nigeria and Niger Republic is approximately 1500 km (Cross-border Diaries, 2008). As of 2018, the Nigerian authorities confirmed the existence of over 1400 illegal entry points linking neighboring countries to Nigeria and 86 formal border posts (Dambazzau as cited in Business Day, 2019). The porous nature of the borders is compounded by inadequate border security personnel, poor logistics, obsolete surveillance facilities, and corruption among the border security agencies. Furthermore, the difficult border terrain has created multiple unpoliced footpaths used by trans-bandits and other criminal elements to cross the border (Okunade, 2017). In Nigeria today, from the north to the south, from the east to the west; insecurity is the order of the day. Lives, properties and in some cases terrorist are lost to various armed groups.

Irregular migration into Nigeria from neighbouring countries such as Niger Republic, Chad, etc are suspected to be the membership recruitment source for criminal/terror groups like Boko Haram, Banditry, etc which are ravaging the Northeast. Migration which involves the movement of people from one geographical location to another with the intention of settling temporarily or permanently in the new location is usually motivated by several factors such as famine, war, environmental degradation, economic recession, youths, unemployment and restiveness, lack of respect for the sanctity of human lives, human right abuses and absence of rule of law. Regardless of the factors, migration becomes irregular when people enter into another without following the due channels and procedures. So fundamentally, irregular migration could constitute a threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria especially in the North east by serving as recruitment source for the dreaded Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram sects as well as other protagonist of insecurity unleashing havoc on the innocent citizens in the Northeast Nigeria which share border with our neighbouring countries namely Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin Republic.

Amongst many factors, porous border have been reckoned to account for the escalation of insecurity in Nigeria Northeast. This is captured by Irabor in Mom (2022) who stated that Nigeria's borders are largely unmanned and easily penetrable especially in Borno, Yobe, Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina states with neighbouring countries such as Niger Republic and Chad, which has continued to be a key source of criminality and violent crimes in those parts of the country. Various criminal elements have exploited the porous borders across Nigeria to proliferate and perpetrate all forms of criminal activities including act of insurgency by the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP).

In other words, this study tries to explore the nature of the porous borders in the study with aim of understanding the role of ISWAP in infirming insecurity in the state.

Review of Literature

Border Management

To understand properly the concept of border management, this study considers it appropriate to highlight the subject of border. According to Adejumobi (2015), border as demarcations found within international divides, covering political entities and affiliates, with legal jurisdiction of states autonomy and sovereignty and a geographical divides that forms the juridical zone between one state and another. Afolayan (2000),

added that border is the line of divides that marks the limit of a country land, legal and sovereign coverage from another. Within this delimited boundary, nations exercise authority and influence, as to what goes in and what comes out of the state. He further noted that it is within this region a country can restrict, accept and ban items, materials and equipment from gaining entry into her territory or otherwise (Afolayan, 2000).

Asiwaju (1984) captured that border is a precincts zone of a state, with significance and authority, restricts unwanted movement of illegal, human and materials including smugglers and their smuggled items. They are characterized by dual dimensional associations between the host nation and her neighbouring state. James (1989) in Mbaegbu (2018) summarised that borders are defined in terms of latitudes, longitudes, geometric circles and straight lines-split several ethnic and cultural communities. Mears (2003) agrees with Egunjobi and Afolayan (2006) when they say that the observably and even ties associated with the total way of life is the identity of a given group in an area of inhabitation are of prominence. Therefore, the unique style of living and the steady interactions and transactions of people within the border communities are closely related to the ideal transactions and interactions found in the open market. In other words, borders include the geographical areas round nation's territorial demarcations between another. Thus, in the same line of thought, Spencer (2007) notes that borders play delicate role in the stability of any nation in terms of peace and conflicts, as the arms used during the period of conflict, violence and crisis are usually smuggled into a target country through her borders.

In the light of the above, border management refers to an approach by border control agencies, both domestic and international, in the context of seeking greater efficiencies over managing trade and travel flows, while maintaining a balance with compliance requirements. It gives prominence to the principle of management of policies, programs and delivery outcomes whilst avoiding any perception of favouring a single solution. Border management is conceived to comprise the following dimensions:

- Border control (checks and surveillance) as defined in the Regulation establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, including the necessary risk analysis and criminal intelligence;
- Investigation of cross-border crime;
- Four-tier access control (measures in third countries, cooperation with neighbouring countries, border control and control measures within the area of free movement);
- Cooperation between the authorities in the field of management of border at the national and international level (border control, customs and police authorities, security services and other relevant authorities): Coordination and coherence of actions taken.

This definition is comprehensive as it identifies the major ideological basis for management of border security. Border management is therefore crucial to a State's involvement in the protection of its population against what it considers as threats ranging from migration, international terrorism, and multiform trafficking as in human beings, drug, raw materials or SALW (Jihan & Cédric, 2010). Interestingly, Nigeria's border points especially in the North-east and North-west no longer perform their strategic functions but serve as channels for smuggling of all sorts of illicit materials into the country. The current security challenges in Nigeria where the nation's Northern borders with Niger and Chad witness the unrestrained incursion of armed bandits to terrorize innocent citizens in towns and villages on the Nigerian side of the border calls for the need to put in place a rather effective border control system (Makka, 1989, cited in Osimen, Anegbode, Akande & Oyewole, 2017).

Insecurity

Simply put, insecurity is the antithesis of security. Accordingly, Belend (2015), sees insecurity as the state of fear and anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection, it refers to lack or inadequate freedom from danger. Insecurity is also seen as the state of being subject to all forms of dangers of both natural and artificial disasters and mostly resulting from human activities towards society or individuals. In the same way, Udoh (2015) opined that insecurity as the state of being subject to danger or injury. It is the anxiety that is experienced when one feels vulnerable, insecure and lack confidence (Adagba, 2012).

Insecurity has attracted such common descriptors as want of safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty, want of confidence, state of doubt, inadequately guarded or protected, instability, trouble, lack of protection and being unsafe. Achuniba, Ighomereho and Akpo (2013), argue further that, these common descriptors point to a condition where there exists a vulnerability to harm, loss of life, property or livelihood. Therefore, they consider insecurity to be a state of not knowing, a lack of control, and the inability to take defensive action against forces that portend harm or danger to an individual or group, or that make them vulnerable. This definition reflects physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity such as economic insecurity and social insecurity.

Poor Border Management and Insurgency in Nigeria

Nigeria's porous borders are one of the major reasons behind her security issues and also one of the factors responsible for illegal International Migration (Adepoju, 2009). There are various unknown path ways mostly in Damaturu and Maduguri in the Northern part of Nigeria that links other neighboring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger still linking to other countries like Libya, Mali, and Sudan. These unknown pathways are unprotected and majorly used for illegal exchange or purchase of arms and other businesses that are considered illegal (Musa, 2013 & Odiaka, 2005). This explains the porosity of the Nigerian borders. Ekpemedede cited in Evans (2016) reveals that there are various unprotected and unknown routes that are used by irregular migrants. In Nigeria there are about four thousand and eighty (4,080) routes in Nigeria out of which only ninety one (91) is legally authorized and protected, this situation puts Nigeria in an unsecured situation. In the words of Nwagwugwu et al, (2015), the porosity of the Nigerian borders can threaten the national security. International Migration in West African region (precisely Nigeria) has experienced undocumented flows of migrants due to the fairly existence of the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) presence and the porous nature of the nation state's borders. Securing Nigeria's porous borders is not going to be any easier because as the nation state begins to develop and the international system begins to engage in International Migration there will be increased movement of goods and people through land, air and sea. This will add even more pressure to an already stretched border security (Ashiru, 2016). According to Blum (2014), the ineffective security measures on entry and exit gates of a nation-state can easily be penetrated if that specific nation state refuses to effectively monitor and focus consciously on every individual (migrant) going out and coming into the nation state as well as effectively monitor every International Migration activities carried out in relation to the nation state in particular. In Nigeria one of the most vital and sensitive borders in West Africa is the Nigerian- Benin border. According to this literature there is said to be an increasing rate of criminal activities from the two (2) countries (Benin and Nigeria respectively).

Blum (2014) reports that the Nigerian – Benin border is weak in governance and control as it gives easy passage of all sorts of crimes and trafficking activities in and out of the nation state. This literature also reveals that the same challenge is also observed in other Nigerian borders respectively. The question remains, what is the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) doing to effectively make sure the Nigerian-Borders are free or drastically reduced from criminal activities? How effective have they carried their duties to ensure that the border are orderly, organized and security free to some extent or totally? According to Naziru et al (2015), the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) with her responsibility to border management can be a positive outcome for Nigeria if the borders can be focused on dedicatedly as border management can bring political development and socio economic development. Effective management of the Nigerian borders by the service (Nigerian Immigration Service) can enhance productive economic activities that are legally and profitable as well as befitting to the Nigerian image portraying assured security as well seen as organized and respected nation state by other West Africans and other foreigners. International Migration in Nigeria has been associated with various crimes and trafficking such as smuggling of arms, other dangerous weapons as well as various prohibited goods. The porosity of the Nigerian borders and its mismanagement results to the just mentioned illegal activities.

A major possible immediate contributing factor to high levels of insecurity in West Africa is its ungoverned and porous borders, where migration is largely untracked. For example, the porosity of Nigeria's ungoverned borders has made it possible for influxes of undocumented migrants from neighbouring countries such as

Benin and Niger (Adeola & Oluyemi, 2012). These migrants, who are mostly young men, are some of the perpetrators of violent crimes in Nigeria (Achumba & Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro, 2013). Also, terrorists and cross-border criminal gangs may blend in with undocumented migrants whenever they cross borders. In other words, terrorists often leverage on the movement of undocumented migrants to migrate untracked, unnoticed and unsuspected to various West African countries (Achumba, et al, 2013). In some cases, large expanses of these borderlands are contested by various terrorist and militant groups, or even under the control of trans-border criminal networks and international terrorists. Given the porosity of these ungoverned territories, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are easily moved without restriction and sold cheaply in some crisis ridden areas of the region. This contributes to further threats to peace and security in the region (ACCORD, OSAA & IOM, 2015). Even the privileges enshrined in the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement have been abused by some citizens of the region (ACCORD, OSAA & IOM, 2015). That is, the opportunities provided by the ECOWAS Protocol are abused by cross-border criminals. Owing to this, the incessant incidents of trans-border armed robbery (such as the networks of Shina Rambo, Hammani Tidjani, militant herders, etc.) and the proliferation of arms and drug trafficking have been largely responsible for insecurity in the region (Florquin & Berman, 2005). The porosity of borders in West Africa as a result of the weak border security system in those (ungoverned) spaces has resulted in easy movement of weapons from other countries in the region into Nigeria and vice versa. Nigeria has approximately 70% of about 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa (Edeko, 2011). Thus, the proliferation and availability of SALW has enabled militant and criminal groups to have easy access to them (Hazen & Horner, 2007).

Poor Border Management and the Resilience of ISWAP Insurgency in the Northeast Nigeria (2015 – 2023)

It is most appropriate to begin this discussion with an account of the evolution of the ISWAP insurgency in the northeast Nigeria. Although the history of Boko Haram remains contested, Muhammad Yusuf is considered its founder (Auwalu, 2013). When he was killed in 2009, Abubakar Shekau assumed leadership of the group and maintained the essential ingredients of the ultra-Salafi extremism espoused by Yusuf. However, he also introduced a “global vision”, openly identifying with other global jihadist organisations (Jacob, 2013). In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged loyalty to IS, taking the name Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Shortly after this development, internal wrangling emerged and, in August 2016, Shekau was deposed and replaced with Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of the late Yusuf. At this point, IS offered guidance on strategy and tried to reconcile the rival factions (Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation, 2019). IS also increased its support for ISWAP as more Boko Haram fighters defected to the latter, allowing ISWAP to overrun at least 14 army bases around the Chad Basin. ISWAP created an extensive shadow government close to the Lake, with firm control of the local economy, including the southern Diffa Region, territories of Niger Region, and areas around northern Borno and Yobe states in Nigeria and towards northern Cameroon.

ISWAP also exploited the digital space for mobilisation and propaganda. Previously, Boko Haram used fake SIM cards to make calls to demand funds, claim responsibility, threaten or intimidate perceived enemies. Between 2016 and 2020, ISWAP is alleged to have released more than 100 videos on YouTube, including beheadings, executions and the stoning to death of those deemed in violation of *shariah*. They also posted images of their fighters carrying out attacks and/or in training, often acquiring suicide skills. ISWAP has used Telegram, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook for its online propaganda. Since November 2019, ISWAP has released a selection of its sold videos on Amazon, Google Play, Vimeo, Dropbox, Flickr and other platforms (Barkindo, 2020). For instance, between December 2019 and August 2020, ISWAP is alleged to have posted a hostage video showing the beheading of 11 Christians, aid workers and soldiers around the Lake Chad borderland (Africanews, 2020).

A 34-page manual on securing communications, developed by IS and quoted in the European Foundation for South Asian Studies report, highlights ISWAP’s deployment of applications such as Twitter, Just paste it, Telegram, iMessage and FaceTime, as well as communication applications considered to have better end-to-end encryption, such as Signal, German Cryptophone and BlackPhone (Barkindo, 2020). The influence of IS has also seen a spike in the recruitment drive of ISWAP in Nigeria. ISWAP’s recruitment drive targets young people, especially teenage boys and girls, who are affected by poverty and relative deprivation.

Estimates indicate that, since February 2019, ISWAP had between 3,500 to 5,000 fighters and JAS had between 1,500 and 2,000 (Reuters, April 30, 2018). The Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation (GICS), a Nigerian research organisation, recently produced a much higher figure for ISWAP's numbers – between 18,000 to 20,000 fighters – apparently based on an unpublished examination of ISWAP's combat groups, built from contacts in the Nigerian military and ISWAP sources. ISWAP has taken the initiative to raise its own funds rather than continuously depend on IS. While IS' financial support was crucial to the survival of ISWAP in 2016 and 2017, by 2018 that support had dropped sharply to just 3.41 per cent of its previous rate, and ISWAP had to look elsewhere for funding. According to the 2019 report by GICS, ISWAP has, from 2018 onwards, earned as much as US\$35.2 million, collected in a combination of Naira, US Dollars and West African CFA Francs from taxes, fees charged to local traders, smugglers and transport drivers of illegal goods across borders. ISWAP's success is linked to its increasing involvement in and control of the trade and production of dried fish, dried pepper and rice (Barkindo, 2020).

However, in March 2019, ISWAP suffered a major setback due to internal disputes and changes in leadership. IS replaced Abu Musab al-Barnawi with Abu Abdullah ibn Umar al-Barnawi (Kelly, 2019). The removal of Abu Musab triggered an untidy flight of ISWAP's top fighters, led by Adam Bitri, a skilful military commander. He unsuccessfully sought collaboration with ANSARU, an earlier militant group that worked closely with AQ (Jacob, 2019). However, he decided to set up a base in Abadam, Bornostate, Nigeria, close to the ISWAP seat of power. Adam Bitri had been a loyal commander to AbuMusab. Afraid of being demoted under a new ISWAP structure, he set up his own base. More significantly, his strategy was to assemble other senior figures and disgruntled elements who lost positions because of the removal of Abu Musab and to confront ISWAP within its own territory. In May 2021, ISWAP fighters tracked down Shekau, the erstwhile leader of Boko Haram. To ISWAP, as long as Shekau was alive, he remained a threat to the emerging structure of ISWAP. Consequently, to obtain loyalty or neutralising him became its two options. When he was tracked down, ISWAP demanded that he surrender and pledge allegiance to them in return for his safety and protection. Shekau, who allegedly had a suicide vest on him, opted to blow himself up rather than surrender (Premium Times, 2021). Despite the setback suffered by ISWAP and the internal disputes that led to the death of Shekau, a close analysis of the group's recent activity in the past two years reveals the continued and potent threat it poses.

ISWAP the New IS Super Ally

The death of Shekau has created a closer collaboration between ISWAP and IS around the Lake Chad Basin. In June 2021, according to the Institute for Security Studies, IS made a proposal to ISWAP to set up four caliphates in Borno, northeast Nigeria, to oversee its activities in the Lake Chad Basin area and beyond. The proposed caliphates were Lake Chad, Sambisa, Timbuktu and Tumbuma, each administered by a governor (*wali*). These four caliphates would be centralized around the Lake Chad caliphate and administered by a *Shura* Council (Consultative Assembly) and *Amirul Jaish* (Military Leader). ISWAP's leader, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, who was earlier replaced and had been in Sambisa since Shekau's death, was elevated to head the *Shura* Council, with all the other governors reporting to him. However, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, an appointee of IS who was to oversee the overall administration of the four caliphates headed by a military commander and two representatives at the IS Council, was killed in a US raid in February 2022 (The New York Times, 2022). At the moment, it is not very clear if his successor, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, has also taken on the role to oversee the four caliphates (Jawad, 2022).

Additionally, IS-ISWAP continues to lobby for the return of former fighters to rejoin ISWAP, particularly those who left during the death of Shekau. So far, evidence suggests that more than 80 of such fighters have returned to Nigeria from Libya since June 2022. IS, in partnership with ISWAP leadership, has also undertaken some reforms to secure the loyalty of returnee fighters. Such reforms include fair treatment, the need to expend the spoils of war at will, an increase in economic incentive, and protection and support of livelihoods for civilians in areas of control. These decisions have given some legitimacy to the returnee fighters, a better bargain than what they would have gotten from the Nigerian government. The result of these changes is evident. During the first four months of 2022, IS claimed responsibility for more operations

in Nigeria than in Iraq. This means Nigeria has emerged as the epicentre for IS activities. On December 29, 2022, a car bomb explosion that killed at least three people in Okene, Kogi state, close to Abuja, Nigeria's Federal Capital, was claimed by ISWAP. This came barely days after another IS-claimed attack in Ebira, also in Kogi state. Since April 2022, ISWAP has also conducted a series of attacks on civilians and security forces in Kogi, Niger, Edo and Ondo states, locations far away from its stronghold in Nigeria's northeast (Abdullahi, 2023).

Evidence suggests that the future of IS-ISWAP in Africa is tied to three key principles – the motivation, the opportunity and the capability to change. So far, IS seems to have the capacity to inspire its members, including the strategic creativity of its leaders to initiate changes for effective transformation and to acquire the necessary skills and resources for sustainability. Consequently, ISWAP will likely seek a greater unification of likeminded groups in Africa. Reports indicate that ISWAP has already branded a group operating in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso as ISWAP.⁴⁷ The formal unification of ISWAP in Lake Chad, with IS factions in the Sahel under a single banner, therefore has the potential to unify terrorist groups beyond Lake Chad to the whole of Africa. Africa may become a centre for strategic coordination due to the opportunities available. Consequently, the potential threat to the entire continent remains uncertain and incalculable.

Another possibility is the fact that, increasingly, the successes of the African IS provinces have been more a product of their own initiatives and not just the administrative requirements of IS (Barkindo, 2023). This means, as the provinces are likely to acquire strong central leadership with vision, innovation and initiative and probably become more independent, governments of the region will find it more challenging to tackle the menace. Additionally, the absence of governance at the border regions and the inability of the government to provide social services to the people means IS-ISWAP will likely provide a sense of protection and will serve as an alternative government, winning the hearts and minds of locals. This will make it more difficult for governments to win the war on terror.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Border management entails the impermeability of a country's border to illegal trespassing or hauling of personnel or material as a result of adequate or efficient border security and monitoring. This means that irrespective of the fact that Nigeria's borders are very wide, and to that extent, difficult to patrol effectively, government should be seen in vigorous pursuit of a solution to the problem; and not merely lamenting about it. A government that merits the appellation has no choice but to find every means to fulfill its constitutional duty of ensuring the security and welfare of the citizens. The management of Nigeria's borders have become a serious concern to citizens given the current complexities of insecurity in Nigeria. The study showed how the porous state of Nigerian borders have contributed to the increase insecurity in Northeast Nigeria through transnational crimes like irregular migration, smuggling of arms and smuggling of drugs. As highlighted by the study, Nigeria has about 261 in the North East and North West regions. Regrettably, out of this 261, only 124 are manned, leaving the remaining 137 unmanned by security agencies. Under such circumstances, Nigeria is a sitting duck for criminal infiltration. Inadvertently, this is what accounts for the level of insecurity in Northeast Nigeria. Thus, the study holds that the current insurgence in North East Nigeria will be effectively curtailed if the Nigerian border is managed effectively. Following the findings of this study, it is recommended that:

1. There is need to tighten border security in Nigeria to weaken the resilience of insurgents in Northeast Nigeria. This is needful given that the current poor state of Nigerian borders creates avenue for foreign fighters to be recruited and be brought into Nigeria to join the insurgence groups in the country.
2. The Nigerian government should rejig the security architecture of border areas with the aim of repositioning the security agencies in a way that would ensure effective prevention and control of arms movement at the border. This should be done by increasing the number of security personnel and patrol system at the border posts and the unpoliced areas which have been devised by smugglers.

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